Hostility Towards Germans Part I: The Anti-German Narrative in the West

Written by Manfred Kleine-Hartlage


Translated by J M Damon


Following is a translation of a blog posted at

The blog begins:

[On 16 July 2011 the author gave a lecture before the Berlin Institute for State Policy on the subject of “Hostility Towards Germans – An Appraisal” in conjunction with the Institute’s 18th Course of Lectures. Unfortunately there are no recordings of this highly interesting event.  In response to requests, I have reconstituted my speech from notes. Since the lecture is too long for a single blog article I am posting it as a series, beginning with “The Anti-German Narrative in the West.]



DEUTSCHENFEINDLICHKEIT (Hostility Toward the German People) Is a Complex Phenomenon.


Many peoples, such as Poles, French, British and Jews, harbor a traditional resentment against the German peoplethat dates from the Second World War and preceding wars.

In addition, there is a kind of intellectual hostility toward all things German that has less to do with dislike of Germans as people than dislike and fear of the German state, which, it is feared, will become too powerful.

There is distrust of the German national character.

There is hostility toward all things German, especially on the part of the migrants who live here.

There is even a certain ant German hostility among the Germans themselves.

There is in fact an entire ideology that includes as one of its central elements DEUTSCHFEINDLICHKEIT (hostility towards all things German.)

[The subject of my lecture was DEUTSCHENFEINDLICHKEIT , or hostility toward the German people.

When in the following I use primarily the word DEUTSCHFEINDLICHKEIT (hostility toward things German) as opposed toDEUTSCHENFEINDLICHKEIT (hostility toward the German people), I am trying to make clear that I am referring not simply to hostility toward Germans, but rather, in a broad and inclusive sense, to various hostilities against German things and attributes in general, such as the cultural VOLK, the state, the general German population, etc.]


The various facets and levels of this complex of hostilities are not isolated or disconnected; they penetrate and reinforce each other and merge to form a real danger for the German VOLK.

The hostility toward things German that Goetz Kubitschek and Michael Paulwitz discuss in their book “DEUTSCHE OPFER – FREMDE TÄTER” (German Victims, Foreign Perpetrators: <>) is only one side of the coin, as I will discuss later on.

The other side of the coin is the hostility that is found in our own camp, which combined with mass migration is creating the real danger of our becoming a minority in own own country.

Obviously this would pose a threat to our domestic security.

“Our own camp” includes especially our power elite, whose anti German hostility poses a strategic problem.

The Western culture that includes Germany forms a broader context.  Its elite evinces anti German hostility that has less to do with actual resentment than with ideology.


The Western anti German Narrative


The most common and widespread basis for hostility toward things German is what I call the Western anti German narrative.

“Narrative” is a new expression in German — we could also speak of an ideology of history.

In this ideology, which is spread by films, literature, and popular depictions of history, Germany has represented a danger for its neighbors in the past and still represents a potential danger.

For this reason Germany must be fettered, disempowered and diluted because the German national character is anti democratic, excessively obedient to established authority, collectivistic, violence prone, warlike, genocidal, etc., etc.

Present day historians are generally too sophisticated to draw a clear and direct line between Luther, Frederick, Bismarck and Hitler, but the lingering effects of such propagandistic historiography are still quite noticeable today, expressed in thetendency to treat all German history as the prehistory of the Third Reich.


One cannot understand this concept of history unless one understands the historical context of the European civil war that has been raging since 1789.

[Hanno Kesting’s work GESCHICHTSPHILOSOPHIE UND WELTBÜRGERKRIEG. DEUTUNGEN DER GESCHICHTE VON DER FRANZÖSISCHEN REVOLUTION BIS ZUM OST-WEST-KONFLIKT (Philosophy of History and Global Civil War: The Significance of the History of the French Revolution to the East-West Conflict), published in 1959, is well worth reading in this regard.

Today it is unavailable even at antiquarian bookstores, but good libraries still have it – at any rate, the BERLINER STAATSBIBLIOTHEK (Berlin State Library) has it.]


This civil war is being fought by the adherents of three ideologies who constantly change their names, slogans and programs but still retain a recognizable identity and continuity.

We are dealing with two utopian and one non-utopian worldviews, Liberalism and Socialism on one hand and what is variously called Conservatism, Reaction or simply the Political Right on the other hand.

Regardless of their differences, both of the utopian-revolutionary ideologies have identifiable similarities that make them so fundamentally distinguishable from the Right that they can be traced back to a common “Meta-ideology.”

The utopian approach assumes that the possibility of peaceful and civilized coexistence among mankind.

This would not have to be a miracle, but is rather something that can come about as a matter of course.

For this reason one does not have to examine and analyze the fundamentals of society itself; one can directly and immediately pursue the realization of paradise on earth, either through gradual reform or revolutionary violence.


The Utopian Ideologies Imply a Number of Assumptions


Firstly, utopian societies hold that man is by nature good.

Social conditions such as inequality and lack of freedom are responsible for the existence of evil and must therefore be banished.

The approach of the political Right is that man is inadequate and weak and mired in original sin and must therefore rely on a social order for support.

Therefore a certain measure of inequality and bondage must be accepted as necessary.

The alternatives are not “Liberty, Equality,Fraternity” but rather chaos, violence and barbarism.


Secondly, Utopian ideologies hold that society can be rationally planned; its design is a matter of reason and enlightenment.

The Right, by contrast, believes that what is traditional and established can be destroyed by criticism, but cannot be replaced by anything better through rational processes.

Examples of what cannot be replaced by rationalism are the concepts of family, faith, tradition and Fatherland.


Thirdly, Utopian societies hold that what is “Good” (such as Freedom and Equality) can be rationally inferred, thus theGood is culturally independent and universally valid.

They believe that mankind can be redeemed if the Utopia derived from Enlightenment principles can be globally introduced.

For Conservatives, on the other hand, each culture is a unique, unplanned and irreproducible response to the elementary question of whether an orderly society is possible.

The Right emphasizes the legitimacy of the particular as opposed to the validity of universal ideology.


Fourthly, Utopian societies harbor the belief that society has to be defined and analyzed according to their standards.

These standards comprise a standpoint of norms rather than facts – thus “What Should Be” trumps “What Is.”

They are derived from rights rather than duties.

The Utopian concept of society confuses itself with “Reason and Enlightenment” because it is built on unreal notions instead of imperfect reality, and thus mistakes itself for “The Good.”

The reason Utopia mistakes itself for “The Good” is because it proceeds from the assumption that Man himself is good, and this implies that “The Bad” resides in social structures and concepts including tradition, articles of faith, duty, etc.

In their way of thinking, if the structures are bad the defenders of these structures must likewise be bad.

Obviously, tolerance cannot be based on such a concept of society; the less it is practiced, the less its adherents feel the need for it.


The Utopian concept of society produces an apocalyptic concept of politics, according to which politics is a struggle between the powers of light and of darkness.

Consequently, war is not perceived as tragic and inescapable.

It is perceived as justified when it is conducted for revolutionary aims and purposes.

In that case, every atrocity is acceptable.

The Utopian concept perceives war as criminal when it is conducted for counterrevolutionary aims and purposes, and then the means by which it is conducted are not taken into consideration.


And what does all this have to do with hostility against all things German?


If we conceive of 20th Century wars as parts of a global ideological civil war, Germany obviously represents the Right.

Germany could never accept the idea that wars are conducted in order to bring about “The Good Order” such as “War to End All War.”

This Utopian idea results in an apocalyptic concept of politics.

The idea of “Good War” is part of the Utopian concept of the liberalist world order as pursued by the Western “democracies” as well as the variant of Communism pursued by the Soviet Union.

The accusation that Germany was striving for world domination, which was put forward at the beginning of the 20th Century, would have been absurd even if not raised by the Anglo Saxon powers!

At every moment of the 19th and 20th centuries, those countries were infinitely closer to world domination than Germany ever was, and they continue to be so in the 21st Century.


Nations that were protected by insular geography have historically indulged in bold thinking and thanks to this geography, have been able to pursue global expansionist policies.

The liberal New World Order that appeared on the world stage before the First World War was also a fitting ideology for global Utopian thinking, since imperialistic power politics functioned as the armed branch of Utopia.

It is not true that one was merely a function of the other.

Both aspects of Anglo Saxon (and particularly American) policy) were aspects of one and the same understanding of politics.


By contrast, Germany traditionally represented institutionalized counter-revolution.

Globalist Utopian thinking was alien to the German power elite, since they faced the reality of governing a state that was constantly threatened from the inside as well as the outside.

Their political horizon was continental as opposed to insular, and so they were concerned with the consolidation of what actually existed.

The Reich did indeed adopt liberal, democratic and even socialistic ideas – consider the Bismarckian social legislation.

However, it did so only on condition that these ideas would consolidate the existing order.

The door was open for socialistic ideas to develop, but they would never be allowed to destroy the existing order.


This political concept (renunciation of revolutionary or utopian policies) determined the policies not only of conservatives, but of the Liberals as well, and ultimately even the policies of the Social Democrats.

The tendency to think in revolutionary and utopian terms was simply alien to Germany — it was too weak and exposed to attempt changing the world order or to entertain ideas of world conquest.

However, Germany was at least potentially strong enough to bring Europe into its sphere of influence and thus block establishment of a new world order; and if Europe were going to be true to its name, it would have to do likewise.


The war against Germany, which, as Winston Churchill observed, was in fact a Thirty Years War lasting from 1914 – 1945, was obviously not fought in response to any “crimes” committed by the National Socialists.

Instead, the Thirty Year War War Against Germany was fought to force Europe into the liberalist-utopian world order and the Anglo Saxon sphere of control.

Germany did not subscribe to any grandiose principle that it wanted to make real.

It was a nation rooted in concrete reality whose order and goals was derived not from utopian designs but practical necessity.

The Germans had no abstract loyalty toward liberal or “democratic” ideals, and this is what brought on the propagandistic accusation of being excessively obedient.


Germany did not pretend to be fighting for universal bliss, therefore it had to defend interests that were defined not ideologically but rather ethnically.

Germany’s enemies construed this as “nationalism.”

In fact, Germany championed communal values instead of individual entitlements.

It was not co-incidence that a current theme in German sociology was Ferdinand Tönnies’ opposition ofGEMEINSCHAFT (Community) to GESELLSCHAFT (Society.)

This is what constituted the “Collectivism” of which the Germans were accused.

Communal ideals are operative only when they are anchored in genuine emotions, the source of the cliche of German “romanticism” and “irrationality.”


In short, the facts that the Germans were different and thought differently from the Anglo Saxons and that they had no sense of Utopia, but rather represented a danger for its global realization, made them the principal enemy figure for Western Utopian thinking.

The cliches about the German national character represent the distorted and demagogically biased description of tendencies and dispositions that actually were (and still are) present.

These cliches were indispensible because a country like Germany could not afford globalistic Utopianism.

As we see today, Germany still cannot afford it.

Whether the Anglo Saxon peoples themselves can continue to afford it remains to be seen…


[Part II of DEUTSCHENFEINDLICHKEIT will deal with the adoption of the Western anti-German narrative by the Germans themselves and the consequences that have arisen from this.




The translator is a “Germanophilic Germanist” who attempts to make noteworthy German articles accessible to Germanophiles who do not read German.









8 Kommentare zu „Hostility Towards Germans Part I: The Anti-German Narrative in the West“

  • „Germany was at least potentially strong enough to bring Europe into its sphere of influence and thus block establishment of a new world order“ (Manfred Kleine-Hartlage)

    This is the bottom-line for why anti-German hate is strong. Germany was the biggest threat to the Anglo-American-Judeo new world order. In fact, the Germans still scare the shit out of these people. It’s not an accident that to this day American television still produces horror movie-like documentaries about the 3rd Reich. Films of this intensity were never made about the Soviet Union during the cold war. Nor are films like this made today regarding radical Islam. These films are war propaganda. Why is war propaganda needed when the war has been over for 65 years?

    „If we conceive of 20th Century wars as parts of a global ideological civil war, Germany obviously represents the Right.“ (Manfred Kleine-Hartlage)

    This is an excellent observation. Sadly the American Right-wing is more anti-German than the Left-wing. In fact there are evangelicals who see Germany as being Biblically evil.

    • In fact, the Germans still scare the shit out of these people. It’s not an accident that to this day American television still produces horror movie-like documentaries about the 3rd Reich. Films of this intensity were never made about the Soviet Union during the cold war. Nor are films like this made today regarding radical Islam. These films are war propaganda. Why is war propaganda needed when the war has been over for 65 years?

      I completely agree with you that the focus on the World War II Holocaust is unique: most in the West are completely unaware of the bad-to-worse mass murders of (say) the Soviet Russian or Red Chinese regimes (more people killed than in Hitler’s Holocaust, though not as many per year as a percentage of people under the regime’s power). I can’t begin to describe how many times I’ve heard Americans (especially Jewish-Americans) say „Never again“ with regards to the German Holocaust, totally missing the point that it has already happened more than once SINCE World War II (most notably under Mao Tse-Tung) or that it had happened before (Hitler was emboldened by the failure of the West to hold the Turks responsible for the genocide of the Armenians during the Great War.

      However, the German Holocaust was REAL. In denying its singularity, you should not deny its reality, because by doing so you are offering your foes a very obvious counterattack.

      The truth is that the erosion of 19th-century liberalism by the poisonous forces of Marxist and other forms of socialism opened the gates wide to some very atavistic and barbaric possibilities — possibilities which the Communists, Nazis, and other Statist parties were to make all too terribly real in the 20th century. Accept the guilt as far as your forefathers are concerned, but do not accept that it was unique to Germany: for it was not. And it is not your guilt — unless you are a lot older and were a lot more influential than I imagine.

  • I agree that the modern West has too negative a view of Germany qua Germany. On the other hand, it is definitely true that something went very badly wrong for Germany in the 1930’s.

    Germany had the opportunity, at that time, to become the bulwark of the West by allying with Britain and France against the Soviet Union. The Western Powers were at that time inclined to forgive Germany her enmity in the Great War (whether or not Germany was in the right or wrong in that war is another issue entirely) as was proven by their later forbearance toward Hitler himself as he rearmed. Had Germany done this, the League of Nations or something very like it would have stood, Germany would have kept her enormously-talented Jewish minority, the country would not have been bombed, invaded and raped with great loss of life in 1944-45, and would have avoided over forty yeas of partition with the eastern half enslaved by Communism, and in the Third World the violent and rushed decolonialization of the post World War II era would have been avoided. The history of the 20th century in general taken a much brighter course — most especially for Germany.

    Instead, Germany chose to ally with the Soviet Union against the West. In this decision, all the later suffering both Germany and much of the world was to endure is encapsulated. Something evil had broken loose into our political world in 1918, and the civilized world should have stood as one to contain and ultimately destroy it: instead, due to Hitler’s poor grasp of grand strategy, it would be enabled to nearly conquer or destroy the world. Hitler failed even on his OWN TERMS: Communism was empowered rather than driven back, and Germany crushed rather than raised to dominance.

    So yes, Germany is today the victim of unreasonable Western prejudice. But it was the poor decisions of the Germans in the 1930’s and World War II that set themselves up for this unenviable position.

    Though I do think it’s long past time to stop blaming Germany for EVERYTHING.

    • I’m afraid your view, though in harmony with the established concept of history, is incompatible with empirical facts. An alliance with the West – especially with Great Britain – on the one hand and with Poland on the other to form a mighty bulwark against the Soviet Union that was identified as the most dangerous threat to Germany (compare the Denkschrift zum Vierjahresplan from 1936, an internal document only for Germany’s most important decision makers, where Hitler explained his view on the international situation) was exactly what Hitler’s policy from 1933/34 to 1939 was aiming at. The decision to form an alliance with the SU was made only after Britain abandoned her former appeasement policy after the occupation of Czechia in march 1939.

      This occupation surely was not only an infringement of international law, but also a serious mistake – for Hitler knew that there was an influential warmonging faction within the British political class, and the Prague coup meant to provide this faction with strong (and, as turned out, decisive) arguments. From that time on, London switched from one extreme to the other. The policy of unconditional backing for Poland meant backing a power whose leadership favoured an extremely aggressive policy, and to make Britain a hostage of those circles.

      Those leaders had had to pursue a policy of more or less good neighbourhood with Germany as long as London was doing appeasement. Once this policy was abandoned, the Polish leaders believed to have been given green light for an aggressive warmonging strategy. It was this situation that made believe Hitler he had no choice but to completely change his political strategy and to try the pact with the devil, i.e. the Soviet Union.

      • An alliance with the West – especially with Great Britain – on the one hand and with Poland on the other to form a mighty bulwark against the Soviet Union that was identified as the most dangerous threat to Germany (compare the Denkschrift zum Vierjahresplan from 1936, an internal document only for Germany’s most important decision makers, where Hitler explained his view on the international situation) was exactly what Hitler’s policy from 1933/34 to 1939 was aiming at.

        I agree, but he executed it badly. In part, this was because of the remaining restraints of the Versailles Treaty, which made Russia useful as a partner in testing new military concepts. But also in part, this was because Hitler proceeded to do thing which frightened the West: the remilitarization of the Rhineland, then the union with Austria, then the annexation of Czechoslovakia (in two stages, after first having promised that he would be satisfied with the Sudetenland, and finally the attack on Poland.

        The decision to form an alliance with the SU was made only after Britain abandoned her former appeasement policy after the occupation of Czechia in march 1939.

        What else was Britain to do, after Hitler had broken the Munich agreement? The only reasonable conclusion on the part of the West at that point was that Hitler’s ambitions were limitless and his promises meaningless.

        Hitler’s mistake here was that he apparently did not realize that Anglo-French appeasement would only go so far. This was a serious underestimation of the Western Great Powers.

        And note, if he wanted to pursue a „drive to the East“ or even a less-ambitious „bulwark of the West“ strategy, Britain and France were exactly the Powers he needed to impress as a reliable ally. By turning them into enemies by annexing first the Sudetenland, then the remainder of Czechoslovakia, and finally invading Poland, he created a situation where he either had to dominate all Europe (and parts of Asia and Africa) or go down in flames.

        He seems to have underestimated the Western Great Powers (most especially America) because he really believed in the supposed superiority of racial unity and despised the Western Powers as „mongrels.“ This led him to predict that the West would back down forever (rather than merely up to a certain point), and also that they would easily surrender.

        He was right only as regarded France. Britain stayed in the war despite the fact that after the Fall of France it was no longer in Britain’s best interests: essentially, Britain gave her last strength to stop Hitler. And America benefitted from her acceptance of immigration: at least half the talent that we used to win World War II came from families and individuals who had arrived in America within the last century or so — in the case of the atomic scientists, who had SPECIFICALLY FLED HITLER.

        The 1939 attack on Poland was foolish. Yes, Poland was itself run by a rather nasty regime (though nowhere near as bad as that of the Third Reich itself), but up until 1939 Poland had been generally pro-German and anti-Russian. These sentiments ran deep — they dated back to the oppression of Poles in Tsarist Russia from the 18th century on, and the relatively better status of Poles in the Second Reich compared to in Tsarist Russia. Poland had fought a war for independence against the Soviet Union.

        Had Hitler courted rather than invaded Poland, the Poles might have been willing, perhaps even eager to accept German military aid to deter the Soviet Union. Instead, for the sake of an admittedly-spectacular quick military victory, Hitler turned not only Poland into Germany’s enemy for generations to come, but also wound up at war with Britain and France. And Britain and France had quite amply warned him: he had no excuse of being surprised.

        I would assume that here Hitler’s reasoning was that the Slavs were also inferior and he thus had little need to court one group of Slavs to fight another group of Slavs, and also that any Western Powers who would side with Slavs against fellow-Germanic peoples were obviously under the control of the Evil Jewish Bolshevik Conspiracy anyway and hence hopelessly lost.

        But that strikes to the heart of how his crackpot racialist theories got in the way of sane grand strategy. The Communist expansionism of the Soviet Union was a real threat, but in order to shield himself against the phantom threats of the Evil Jewish Conspiracy and pan-Slavism, he gutted Germany of talent by rejecting the Jews (resulting in the flight of the most talented German Jews and the reduction of the rest to brute-force labor or corpses, wasting their skills) and robbed Germany of allies by attacking Poland and hence going to war against Britain and France.

        (And yes, I’m quite aware Britain and France actually declared war on Germany. But this was only after Germany had attacked Poland, against Anglo-French warnings).

        This was not a good thing for Germany. If the German military hadn’t been one of the best in the world at the time, the Polish and French campaigns might have been defeats, or much less rapid victories. As things turned out, the brilliant victories of 1939 and 1940 only prolonged the war — they could not win it.

        The point at which Hitler really committed suicide was the declaration of war on Aemrica in December 1941. His invasion of Russia in June was perhaps justifiable by strategic necessity, but the war on America was not. If Hitler hadn’t done this, Franklin Delano Roosevelt would have faced heavy political pressure to go to war with Japan and only Japan. By the time America beat Japan, Germany might have beaten Russia, and America accepted the German victory as fait accompli. Instead, FDR was able to not only go to war against Germany but beat Germany first.

        The pattern is the same in each of these errors. Hitler wrongly assumed that potential allies or at least neutrals were his fanatical enemies, and made the prophecy self-fulfilling by striking them first, thus ensuring</i. their fanatical enmity. Starting with the German Jews, then the Western Slavs, then Britain and France and finally America, Hitler turned all who might have helped Germany into mortal foes, and in the end Germany succumbed to the mass of enemies Hitler had made.

        Paranoia, on a massive scale.

        The decision to form an alliance with the SU was made only after Britain abandoned her former appeasement policy after the occupation of Czechia in march 1939.

  • Ade:

    Greetings from England.

    I think there may be an agenda to try to create another War With Germany in Europe, I believe that the powers that be would like this so they can put Europe under UN / NWO control.
    Here is an interview in 12 parts, note how he says that Germans run the Bankimng system, thankfully, many in his audience know this to be untrue.

    Part 1 of 12